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The Square of Opposition: Innovations in Teaching Logic
Introduction
Teaching logic of any type to novices can come with a variety of challenges. Many
concepts, when approached linguistically, appear to be intuitive. However, the abstraction of
language into logical symbols may transform what was once intuitively understood into
something that appears to be foreign or not immediately relatable to a given student’s modes
of everyday reasoning. Specifically, new students in critical thinking courses may struggle with
making inferences of categorical statements using the classical square of opposition.
There is much debate among philosophers and others over the proper approach to
teaching critical thinking (Robinson, 278-85) (McPeck, 66-95). May instructors teach only informal
logic in their courses, perhaps believing that the ability to find and identify informal fallacies
applies more readily to the “real world.” Even in courses where formal logic is taught, however,
there are those who believe that modern logic has rendered the teaching of classical categorical
logic –which includes the classical square of opposition – as obsolete. By contrast, this paper
takes the position that there is still value in teaching classical logic in introductory critical
thinking courses.

DiMartino 2

First of all, classical categorical logic reflects the intuitions of everyday reasoning. For
example, in modern logic, the inference from a true universal affirmative statement to the truth
of the associated particular affirmative cannot be made due to the issue of existential import,
and rightly so under the commonly accepted interpretation (The accepted interpretation of
existential import results from answers to these questions: Do universal statements imply their
associated particular statements? And, to what degree do our particular statements imply the
existence of their subjects?). With the assumption that universal statements never imply the
existence of their subjects, paired with the assumption that particular statements always imply
the existence of their subjects, it logically follows that we cannot infer the truth of an existing
particular based on a universal statement that does not imply existence. In a common,
everyday context, however, reasoning from the truth of a universal to the truth of a particular is
not always considered to be erroneous. In the types of informal discussions that we have
regularly, the issue of existential import rarely surfaces. When someone infers that “Some
particular turtle has a shell” from the statement that “All turtles have shells,” there is nothing
within the typical interpretation of those statements that indicates the possibility that turtles
may not exist. To put it more simply, basic discussions with pragmatic goals do not focus on the
assertion (via statements) of the existence of their subjects, because in most cases, their
existence is assumed.
Additionally, in more academic or specialized contexts, classical logic has value for
students. Primarily, a given person cannot be expected to fully understand modern logic
without understanding issues such as the problem of existential import, and the problem of
existential import cannot be properly understood without a grasp of classical logic issues that
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are being addressed by modern logic. In short, understanding where we come from, logically,
tells us about where we are, and where we may be heading.
Regarding the shift toward a focus on informal reasoning in entry level critical thinking
courses, an argument can be made that the type of approach stressing informal reasoning does
not give students a functional understanding of the procedures used in such reasoning, thus
denying the student an opportunity to practice and develop the skills necessary to make proper
inferences. No doubt, the ability to recognize and identify informal fallacies is a useful one.
Even so, this is only half of the battle. What remains untouched in pedagogical techniques
focusing exclusively on informal reasoning is the exposure to actual logical procedures at play
and the reasoning behind them. Students can then end up lacking the skills required to
translate ordinary statements into their standard symbolic form or to work with such formal
statements at an abstract level - a skill that contains benefits for any given student. Primarily, it
is beneficial for students to be able to work with the symbolic representations of statements
Instead of parsing out inferences linguistically; standardized symbols allow students to focus
solely on the logical operations required, thus avoiding any misleading ambiguities that may be
present in the language.
Detractors of teaching classical logic sometimes object that making inferences from
basic categorical propositions is intuitively obvious, and therefore should not be afforded the
class time it takes to teach the technical aspects of such inferences. While it can be generally
agreed upon that many inferences of categorical propositions are intuitively obvious, such
dismissiveness oversimplifies the issue. Students may have differing levels of intuition, and, as
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stated, the abstraction into unfamiliar symbols can undercut even intuitively obvious
inferences. In any case, a person’s intuitions can potentially be wrong, and it is always
beneficial to supplement individual or prima facie intuitions through the cultivation and
practice of technical skills.
Apologetics aside, many instructors still incorporate classical logic into their curriculum,
and as long as they do, there will be the need for innovation in those teaching methods and
presentation styles related to it. To that end, the remainder of this paper presents a new
technique for teaching one specific model often featured in classical logic: the Square of
Opposition.
The Traditional Square of Opposition
One important aspect of critical thinking is the ability to reason and draw inferences
from simple categorical statements. The square of opposition, a logical diagram, was designed
to visually indicate the relationships between four different types of categorical statements:


the universal affirmative (the A statement, meaning “all [subject] are
[predicate],” symbolized as SaP)



the universal negation (the E statement, meaning “no [subject] are [predicate],”
symbolized as SeP)



the particular affirmative (the I statement, meaning “one or more [subject] are
[predicate],” symbolized as SiP)



the particular negation (the O statement, meaning “one or more [subject] are
not [predicate],” symbolized as SoP)
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These statements relate to each other in a variety of types of opposition. An A
statement and its corresponding E statement have what is known as a contrary relationship,
meaning that they cannot both be simultaneously true, but they can be simultaneously false.
Similarly, an I statement and its corresponding O statement have what is known as a
subcontrary relationship, meaning that they cannot be simultaneously false, but they can be
simultaneously true.
Furthermore, an A statement and its corresponding O statement, and an E statement
and its corresponding I statement, relate as contradictories. Statements that relate as
contradictories cannot have identical truth values (if one contradictory is true, the other must
be false. If one contradictory is false, the other must be true). Lastly, an A statement and its
corresponding I statement, and an E statement and its corresponding O statement relate as
alterns. The universal statements are referred to as superalterns and the particular statements
are referred to as subalterns. The relationship between superalterns and their corresponding
subalterns can be described with two sub-rules: (a) The truth of a superaltern (an A statement
or an E statement) implies the truth of its corresponding subaltern (an I statement or an O
statement, respectively), and (b) The falsehood of a subaltern implies the falsehood of its
associated superaltern.
The idea behind making categorical inferences is this:
Given one of the four basic categorical propositions and a truth
value, and using the described relations as rules of inference, a
given person can infer the truth value of the remaining three

Figure 1
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propositions. This process is visualized in the square of opposition (fig.1). While there are
historical and contemporary variations in how the square of opposition is depicted (Bernhard),
figure 1 represents a common presentation.
Pedagogical Stumbling Blocks to Mastering the Logic of the Square
While many of the rules of inference are linguistically intuitive, the first step in making
immediate inferences is the proper translation from language into logical symbols. Once a
student is dealing with symbolic representations of statements, these intuitively easy
inferences can become obscured by viewing them in a simplified, symbolic state. Additionally,
there is not a standardized visualization of the square of opposition, and many depictions
include potentially confusing elements. For example, some depictions of the square of
opposition utilize arrows to indicate the relationships between a superaltern and its related
subaltern. This can become problematic. For example: when making an inference from a true
superaltern, we can carry that truth value downward in the direction of the arrow. If the given
superaltern is false, however, we cannot simply carry the false value downward in the same
way due to the altern sub-rule (b). Yet, the inclusion of an arrow as described above - arrows
imply directionality and motion, not necessarily relationships such as those focused on in
immediate inferences - may mislead students into thinking that this inference is correct,
because they are following the direction of the arrow.
Some diagrams attempt to account for this type of error by including additional arrows
pointing upwards from a subaltern to its associated superaltern. Despite this attempt to
mitigate confusion, there is not usually any visual indicator as to when one should follow the
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downward arrow instead of the upwards arrow, because the nature of the diagram is to
represent these concepts without the use of words. Therefore confusion can be paradoxically
compounded by an adaptation meant to lessen that confusion.
Aside from these problems, there are certain inferences that cannot be made, which
results in a truth value of unknown. For example, when given a superaltern as false, we cannot
make the inference that its associated subaltern is either true or false, and at best can only infer
that the truth value is unknown. While the existence of unknown inferences is included
implicitly in the rules of inference of categorical propositions, this fact is never visually indicated
in the tools and diagrams that are typically available to students.
To add to the number of potential roadblocks that a new student of logic might face,
oftentimes the required textbooks used in critical thinking courses do little in terms of offering
a variety of useful tools to help students of differing backgrounds and capabilities to come to a
higher level of understanding. Introductory logic textbooks tend to focus on a text-based
description of the processes involved, which is often less clear than a verbal lecture or real-time
demonstration. They are also, quite typically, jargon heavy, which can lead to frustration if a
student is already struggling. Additionally, most textbooks repeat or reuse the same or similar
visual representations of the square of opposition (Kelly, 152-57) (Baronett, 173-77) (Parker,
Moore, 253-54) (Salmon, 326-30) (Cohen, McMahon, Copi, 80-83). Others discard the arrows, but do

little else to alter how the information is conveyed (Hurley, 211).
While such depictions can vary slightly from text to text, all lack innovative and new
ways of visualizing the necessary processes of making immediate inferences from categorical
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propositions. When the producers of a text book do decide to innovate, the resulting product
may become even further abstracted from a student’s grasp of essential relationships, resulting
in a model that is no more intuitive than the traditional depiction.
Aside from difficulties that arise from issues related to the specific subject matter,
teaching classical logic can also be hampered by more general issues of teaching that manifest
themselves in any given classroom. Large classrooms in particular are comprised of a diverse
collection of students, each with their own talents, strengths, weaknesses, and approaches to
the material. Some students may respond positively to text based explanations, whereas others
may have difficulties memorizing long or complex lists of rules and axioms. All of this can make
planning a curriculum and setting standards a challenge. Instructors in any field can benefit
from adding more tools to their heuristic tool belt for those students that might not respond
well to standardized approaches.
Creating New Tools for Teaching Classical Logic: Dimo’s Square
Creating new educational tools can be easy and effective once specific difficulty areas
are discovered and identified. Further, the development of visual models and other heuristic
devices, even for less common areas of difficulty, can be beneficial on a larger scale; the
resulting method or model may have other intrinsic attributes that can enhance the learning
outcomes of students whose difficulties stem from completely unrelated areas. An example of
one alternative approach to teaching immediate inferences of categorical propositions is
“Dimo’s Square (fig.2),” a newly innovated model of the traditional square of opposition.
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Dimo’s Square, like the traditional square of opposition,
visually indicates the process of making immediate inferences
of categorical propositions. Furthermore, Dimo’s Square and
the traditional models are logically identical, meaning that all
inferences made will yield identical results1. The difference
emerges from the manner of inference delivery.
Dimo’s Square separates the traditional square into two

Figure 2

different squares, one for true statements, and one for false statements. Once given a case as
true or false, only the square that corresponds to that truth value is used (in other words, if
given a true statement, use the top square only. If given a false statement, use the bottom
square only). Overlapping the two squares is a circled area that indicates a zone containing the
statements which produce unknown inferences.
DImo’s Square can be operated by implementing two rules and one exception. The rule
of contradiction states that any two statements connected by a diagonal line cannot have the
same truth value. The rule of alterns states that, if a statement on an upper corner of either
square is true, then any statement connected to it by a vertical line is also true. There is one
exception to the rule of alterns: when given a case that is within the circled area, use the rule of
contradiction only; all other inferences are unknown.
As an example: When given “SaP is true” as your starting case, begin at the A corner of
the true square. Then, employ the rule of contradiction to determine that SoP is false. Using the

1

Formal proofs are included on pages 14 to 23
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rule of alterns, it can be determined that SiP is also true. Then, employing the rule of
contradiction on the valid inference “SiP is true,” it can be concluded that SeP is false.
Another example that includes the use of one exception: When given “SeP is false” as
your starting case, begin at the E corner of the false square. Note that the given case is within
the circle, and the rule of alterns cannot be used. Then, employ the rule of contradiction to
determine that SiP is true. Without another rule, no further inferences can be made, so the
remaining statements, SaP and SoP, are unknown.
Comparative Analysis: Dimo’s Square and the Tradtional Model
The primary purpose behind creating Dimo’s Square was to assist students who had
difficulties identifying the statements that produced unknown inferences. Instead of using just
four basic statements that are then assigned a truth value, and consequently processed
through the diagram, Dimo’s Square “bundles” the truth value along with the basic categorical
statements, which gives a total of eight possible base cases (a true and a false version of each of
the four basic statements). This allows for the square to be separated into a true square and a
false square, giving the user a dedicated corner for all eight possible cases. Stacking the two on
top of each other neatly groups the corners representing the statements that result in unknown
inferences. The circle around them strongly indicates the group as such.
This particular presentation of the square of oppositions has many benefits. Most
notably, on a surface level, it visually indicates the statements that will produce unknown
inferences. Unknown inferences, while clearly indicated in the rules of the traditional square,
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are never visually indicated within the traditional diagram. Dimo’s Square addresses this
problem directly in both, through its rules and in its visualization.
Dimo’s Square also gives the user a dedicated corner for each possible combination of
true or false basic statements. The traditional representation has four corners that can accept
either true or false variables. This may seem to be simpler, as the number of basic statements
in this approach is limited to four. However, a true value in a given corner on the traditional
square may call for a different directional procedure than a false value. Having dedicated
starting points for each possible combination insures that no corner is doing two jobs. Each
corner deals exclusively with one type of true or false statement.
Another minor but beneficial consequence of Dimo’s Square is, due to its arrangement,
there is no need for arrows in any way. As mentioned in the earlier discussion of problems with
traditional models of the square, arrows imply a directionality of motion that can be misleading
for novice logicians. By contrast, with Dimo’s Square, all rules are described and defined in
terms of their horizontal and diagonal connector lines, which indicates a type of relationship,
not a direction. This greatly reduces the chances of a student making an error when dealing
with the superaltern or subaltern of a given case.
Finally, and perhaps the most notable property of Dimo’s Square, is that it requires
fewer rules to operate. The traditional square requires the memorization of four rules (but only
if you count the rule of alterns as one rule, which may be a little disingenuous due to the fact
that it is comprised of two sub-rules. This may be perceived by students as an attempt to
“sneak in” an additional rule without admitting that one had done so). Dimo’s Square, as
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described above, requires only two rules and one exception. Due to the arrangement of Dimo’s
square, it is not necessary to have specific rules for contraries and subcontraries. Additionally,
the rule of alterns remains as a single rule, not a pair of sub-rules. And while Dimo’s Square
could also be criticized for “sneaking in” a rule by having an exception (which could be treated
as a third rule), it is always easier to remember not to do something than it is to remember a
thing that you need to do. Regardless, even including the exception of the rule of alterns as the
third in its list of rules, Dimo’s Square still operates with two fewer rules than its traditional
counterpart. This attribute of Dimo’s Square may be enough to distinguish itself from its
predecessor in terms of its elegance. To produce the same results with fewer axioms and, even
in some cases, fewer steps, is almost always more desirable than any other alternative, and
surely in line with the spirit of Occam’s Razor.
A possible criticism of Dimo’s Square is that it trades visual simplicity for verbal or
rhetorical simplicity. While it may be true that Dimo’s Square can be operated with fewer rules,
the visualization required for this method is more complex. There are two squares instead of
one, and it requires a circle to indicate when to enact the exception. That said, the degree to
which two squares and a circle are harder to memorize than a single square is possibly
negligible, and Dimo’s Square has the advantage of being visually distinctive as well as verbally
legible.
In light of this comparative discussion, it is important to note that many students may
become overwhelmed when confronted with a barrage of diagrams and visualizations. It is
almost always better to begin with a generalized approach until it becomes clear that there are
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specific difficulties being experienced by a student. In other words, only when there are
specialized problems should there be specialized solutions. The development of Dimo’s Square
arose in response to one such specialized problem, hence its presentation of one such
specialized solution.
Conclusion
When it comes to teaching logic, the common approaches tend not to stray far from
traditional methods of representation. While having a general strategy is essential to teaching
within any field, it can result in a failure to provide the necessary skills and information to those
students who may not respond well to such generalized methods. While some believe that it
may be pragmatically useless to focus time and effort on developing methods for outliers - that
it is always more efficient to use a “best fit curve” approach in designing curricula and teaching
tools - Dimo’s Square shows otherwise. It is rooted in the teleology of mastery and driven by (i)
a desire to convey the information in a way that can be understood, (ii) a functional
understanding of what aspects of the material are confusing to students and (iii) a
determination to reimagine a heuristic that conventional teaching assumes is long exhausted of
its possibilities. Hopefully, this paper has demonstrated the persistence of possibilities.
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PROOFS
General Rules
All given cases must: Contain one Subject and one Predicate, in that order. Be of one and only
one type (either A, E, I, or O). Be given as either True or False, but not both.
Rules of Inference (Traditional square)
Contradictories: Contradictory statements are connected by diagonal lines. Contradictory
statements cannot have the same truth value; if one is true, the other must be false. If one is false,
the other must be true.
Alterns: Alterns are connected by vertical lines. Universal statements (A and E) are
“superalterns.” Particular statements (I and O) are “subalterns.”
a) If a superaltern is true, its related subaltern is also true. If a superaltern is false, then its related
subaltern is unknown.
b) If a subaltern is true, its related superaltern is unknown. If a subaltern is false, then its related
superaltern is also false.
Contraries: Universal statements (A and E) that are connected by a horizontal line are
“contraries.” If a given contrary statement is true, the other must be false. If a given contrary
statement is false, the other is unknown.
Sub-Contraries: Particular statements (I and O) that are connected by a horizontal line are “subcontraries.” If a given sub-contrary statement is true, the other is unknown. If a given subcontrary is false, the other is unknown.

Rules of Inference (Dimo’s Square) Note: when given true statements, use the top square
only. When given false statements, use the bottom square only.
Contradictories: Contradictory statements are connected by diagonal lines. Contradictory
statements cannot have the same truth value; if one is true, the other must be false. If one is false,
the other must be true.
Alterns: Alterns are connected by vertical lines. Universal statements (A and E) are
“superalterns.” Particular statements (I and O) are “subalterns.” If a superaltern is true, its related
subaltern is also true.
Exception: If the given case falls within the circled area, use the rule of contradiction only. Any
other inferences that would require the use of an additional rule are unknown.
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